Deaths on February 14

Ronald Dworkin, American philosopher and scholar (b. 1931)

Ronald Myles Dworkin: A Seminal Figure in Legal and Political Philosophy

Ronald Myles Dworkin (December 11, 1931 – February 14, 2013) was an extraordinarily influential American philosopher, distinguished jurist, and leading scholar of United States constitutional law. His profound contributions to both the philosophy of law, often referred to as jurisprudence, and political philosophy reshaped contemporary understanding of how law functions, how judges should interpret it, and its inherent connection to moral principles. Dworkin's intellectual journey was marked by a relentless pursuit of coherence and integrity within the legal system, firmly establishing him as one of the most significant legal thinkers of the past century.

Academic Career and Prestigious Appointments

Dworkin’s distinguished academic career spanned some of the world's most prestigious institutions. At the time of his passing, he held the esteemed positions of Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University (NYU) and Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London (UCL). These dual appointments underscored his global reach and the interdisciplinary nature of his scholarship, bridging law with deeper philosophical inquiry.

Prior to his roles at NYU and UCL, Dworkin taught at Yale Law School, where he began to cultivate his groundbreaking ideas. A particularly notable chapter in his career was his tenure as Professor of Jurisprudence at the University of Oxford. Here, he succeeded the renowned British philosopher H. L. A. Hart, a towering figure in legal positivism. This succession was not merely an academic appointment; it symbolized a significant intellectual shift in legal philosophy, as Dworkin’s work directly challenged and offered a compelling alternative to Hart's influential positivist theories, setting the stage for decades of robust scholarly debate.

Core Philosophical Contributions

Ronald Dworkin’s work profoundly reoriented the landscape of legal theory, moving away from a strict separation of law and morality towards an integrated view. His theories provided a powerful framework for understanding how legal systems derive their authority and how judges ought to adjudicate complex cases.

The Theory of Law as Integrity

Among Dworkin's most influential and enduring contributions is his theory of "law as integrity," meticulously elaborated in his seminal 1986 book, Law's Empire. This theory posits that judges, when interpreting and applying the law, should strive to view it as a coherent and consistent body of moral principles. Rather than merely applying existing rules or attempting to discern the historical intent of lawmakers, judges are, in Dworkin's view, engaged in a constructive interpretation. They must try to make the law the best it can be, presenting it as if it were the product of a single, coherent moral author.

This approach emphasizes the paramount importance of two specific moral principles: justice and fairness. For Dworkin, a judge interpreting the law must seek an interpretation that both "fits" the existing legal materials (statutes, precedents) and "justifies" them morally, making the law as principled and morally sound as possible. This contrasts sharply with legal positivism, which argues for a clear separation between law (what is) and morality (what ought to be).

The Moral Reading of the United States Constitution

A direct application of his broader interpretivist philosophy, Dworkin advocated for a "moral reading" of the United States Constitution. This approach argues that many of the Constitution’s most important clauses—such as those guaranteeing equal protection, due process, or freedom of speech—are not merely historical artifacts or precise legislative commands. Instead, they represent abstract moral principles that judges have a responsibility to elaborate and apply in contemporary contexts.

Under a moral reading, judges are encouraged to engage with the underlying moral commitments of these constitutional principles, developing their meaning through reasoned argument rather than being strictly bound by the original framers' specific intentions or the literal text alone. This ensures that the Constitution remains a living document capable of addressing evolving societal norms and protecting fundamental rights in new and unforeseen circumstances, fostering a dynamic and principled constitutional democracy.

An Interpretivist Approach to Law and Morality

At the heart of Dworkin's philosophy was an interpretivist approach to law and morality, asserting that the two are inextricably linked. He fundamentally rejected the notion that law could be understood or practiced without reference to moral considerations. For Dworkin, legal interpretation is inherently a moral enterprise, requiring judges and legal scholars to engage in a process of moral reasoning to ascertain the "best" interpretation of legal texts and practices. This comprehensive framework challenged the prevailing legal theories of his time, emphasizing the normative dimensions of law and the crucial role of moral principles in legal decision-making.

Recognition, Influence, and Legacy

Ronald Dworkin's intellectual rigor and groundbreaking ideas garnered widespread recognition and left an indelible mark on legal and political thought across the globe.

Major Awards and Acclaim

In 2007, Dworkin was honored with the prestigious Holberg International Memorial Prize in the Humanities, often referred to as the "Nobel Prize of the Humanities." The award citation specifically recognized him for "his pioneering scholarly work," noting its "worldwide impact." This significant accolade underscored the universal appeal and profound influence of his theories beyond the confines of American legal scholarship.

Further testament to his impact came from a survey published in The Journal of Legal Studies, which identified Dworkin as the second most-cited American legal scholar of the twentieth century. This remarkable statistic highlights the pervasive presence of his ideas in legal academic discourse. Following his death, the prominent Harvard legal scholar Cass Sunstein eloquently summarized Dworkin's towering stature, stating, "He was one of the most important legal philosophers of the last 100 years. He may well head the list."

A Public Intellectual

Beyond his academic contributions, Dworkin was a frequent and prominent commentator on contemporary political and legal issues, particularly those concerning the Supreme Court of the United States. He often shared his insightful analyses in the pages of The New York Review of Books, a respected platform for intellectual debate. This engagement with public discourse allowed Dworkin to bring complex philosophical arguments to a wider audience, shaping public understanding and debate on critical legal questions of his time.

Frequently Asked Questions About Ronald Dworkin

What is Ronald Dworkin best known for?

Ronald Dworkin is most renowned for his groundbreaking theory of "law as integrity," which he detailed in his book Law's Empire. This theory posits that judges interpret law by seeking to make it the most coherent and morally justifiable set of principles possible. He is also celebrated for his advocacy of a "moral reading" of the U.S. Constitution and his broader interpretivist approach to law and morality.

What academic positions did Ronald Dworkin hold?

At the time of his death, Dworkin was the Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law and Philosophy at New York University (NYU) and Professor of Jurisprudence at University College London (UCL). Previously, he held professorships at Yale Law School and the University of Oxford, where he famously succeeded H. L. A. Hart as Professor of Jurisprudence.

What is "Law as Integrity"?

"Law as integrity" is Dworkin's theory that judges should interpret the law as if it were the product of a single, coherent moral author. This means they should strive to find an interpretation that both "fits" the existing legal materials (statutes, precedents) and "justifies" them morally, making the law as principled as possible. It emphasizes consistency, justice, and fairness as central to legal reasoning, contrasting with views that separate law from morality.

What does the "moral reading" of the U.S. Constitution entail?

The "moral reading" suggests that key constitutional clauses, particularly those pertaining to rights, embody abstract moral principles rather than fixed, literal meanings or historical intentions. Judges adopting this approach are tasked with identifying and elaborating these underlying moral principles to apply them in new contexts, ensuring the Constitution remains relevant and continues to protect fundamental rights as society evolves.

What major award did Ronald Dworkin receive for his work?

Ronald Dworkin received the prestigious 2007 Holberg International Memorial Prize in the Humanities. This award recognized his "pioneering scholarly work" and its "worldwide impact" on legal and political philosophy.