Events on January 30 in history

The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence between Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca and the British official Henry McMahon concerning the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire ends.

Understanding the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence: A Pivotal Exchange in World War I

The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence represents a crucial series of ten letters exchanged between July 1915 and March 1916 during World War I. These secret communications involved Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca and ruler of the Hejaz region, and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner to Egypt. In essence, the British government sought to secure Arab support against the Ottoman Empire, then an ally of the Central Powers. In return for an Arab uprising, the United Kingdom formally pledged to recognize Arab independence in a significant portion of the Middle East after the war's conclusion. This exchange, a complex piece of wartime diplomacy, would profoundly impact the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East for decades to come, particularly in relation to the unresolved dispute over Palestine.

British Motivations: Countering a Jihad and Securing Imperial Stability

The British decision to engage in such high-stakes negotiations with an Arab leader stemmed from multifaceted strategic considerations:

• Countering the Ottoman Jihad: A primary concern for the British was to neutralize the Ottoman Sultan's declaration of jihad, or "holy war," against the Allied Powers. As the Caliph of Islam, the Sultan held significant religious authority over Sunni Muslims worldwide. British officials feared this declaration could incite unrest among Muslim populations within the British Empire, most notably in British India.
• Maintaining Stability in British India: British India, then encompassing present-day India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, was home to an estimated 70 million Muslims. A considerable number of these individuals served in the crucial Indian Army, which was deployed across all major theatres of the wider war. The British were acutely aware that any widespread disaffection among these Muslim soldiers or the broader population could severely undermine the war effort and imperil imperial control. By supporting an Arab revolt led by a prominent Hashemite figure like Sharif Hussein, the British aimed to present an alternative Islamic authority that could challenge the Ottoman Caliph's influence and rally support for the Allied cause, or at least prevent hostile actions.
• Military Expediency: While not the primary driver, there was also a recognized military value in securing Arab manpower and their invaluable local knowledge. The prospect of an Arab Revolt operating alongside British forces in the Ottoman territories, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant, offered a significant tactical advantage.

The Contested Boundaries of Arab Independence

A central point of enduring controversy within the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence was the ambiguous definition of the territories promised for Arab independence. The agreement stipulated that the area would be "in the limits and boundaries proposed by the Sherif of Mecca," with the crucial exception of "portions of Syria" lying to the west of "the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo."

• Conflicting Interpretations: The vague wording of this exclusion clause immediately led to conflicting interpretations. The British later argued that the "portions of Syria" to the west of the specified districts implicitly included Palestine, thus excluding it from the promised independent Arab state. However, Arab leaders, including Sharif Hussein, consistently maintained that Palestine, a district of Syria at the time, was indeed intended to be part of the future independent Arab realm, believing it was not explicitly excluded. This fundamental disagreement over the territorial status of Palestine, in particular its coastal regions, became a source of profound mistrust and continues to be debated by historians and political analysts to this day.

The Unraveling of Promises: Balfour, Sykes-Picot, and Arab Betrayal

The agreements outlined in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence were perceived by Arab leaders as fundamentally violated by subsequent British actions and revelations:

• The Sykes–Picot Agreement (1916): Secretly negotiated between Britain and France in 1916, this agreement proposed a detailed plan for the post-war division and occupation of large parts of the Ottoman Empire's Arab territories into respective spheres of influence. This understanding directly contradicted the spirit, if not the letter, of the promises made to Sharif Hussein regarding comprehensive Arab independence. The agreement remained secret until it was leaked by the Bolsheviks in Russia in late 1917, causing immense anger and disillusionment among Arab leaders.
• The Balfour Declaration (November 1917): This public statement, a letter from British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour to Baron Rothschild, a prominent leader in the British Jewish community and a key figure in the Zionist movement, explicitly promised "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." This declaration, made while the war was still ongoing and without explicit consultation with Arab leaders, was seen as a direct repudiation of the understanding that Palestine would be part of an independent Arab state. It laid the groundwork for future conflicts by creating competing claims over the same territory.

Sharif Hussein's Defiance and Downfall

The perceived betrayal deeply impacted Sharif Hussein and his stance on post-war arrangements.

• Rejection of Treaties and Mandates: Hussein refused to ratify the 1919 Treaty of Versailles, which formalized the end of World War I and laid the groundwork for the League of Nations Mandate system. Under this system, former Ottoman territories were to be administered by Allied powers as "mandates" until they were deemed ready for self-governance, effectively creating a new form of colonial control. In response to a British proposal in 1921 to sign a treaty accepting this Mandate system, Hussein famously stated that he could not be expected to "affix his name to a document assigning Palestine to the Zionists and Syria to foreigners."
• Failed Negotiations and British Withdrawal of Support: Further British attempts to negotiate a treaty with Hussein failed between 1923 and March 1924. This diplomatic impasse, coupled with growing British frustration, led to a critical shift in policy. Within six months of suspending negotiations in March 1924, the British withdrew their financial and political support from Hussein. Instead, they redirected their backing to their central Arabian ally, Ibn Saud, the dynamic leader of the Nejdi kingdom. This strategic shift enabled Ibn Saud to swiftly conquer Hussein's Hashemite Kingdom of Hejaz by 1925, incorporating it into what would eventually become Saudi Arabia.

The Enduring Legacy and Public Disclosure

The McMahon–Hussein Correspondence "haunted Anglo-Arab relations" for many decades. Its conflicting promises contributed significantly to the deep mistrust and resentment that characterized British interactions with Arab nations throughout the 20th century, laying the groundwork for many of the region's enduring conflicts.

• Gradual Public Disclosure: The letters were not immediately made public in full, contributing to speculation and controversy. Unofficial excerpts began to appear in the press, such as those published by Joseph N. M. Jeffries in the Daily Mail in January 1923, and copies circulated within the Arab press. Further excerpts were officially included in the 1937 Peel Commission Report, which investigated the causes of unrest in Palestine. The complete correspondence was finally published in George Antonius's influential 1938 book, The Arab Awakening, which became a foundational text for Arab nationalism. Official British publication followed in 1939 as Cmd. 5957. Additional related documents were declassified in 1964, providing further historical context to this complex diplomatic episode.

Frequently Asked Questions About the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence

What was the primary goal of the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence?

The primary goal was for the United Kingdom to secure Arab military support against the Ottoman Empire during World War I in exchange for promises of post-war Arab independence.

Who were the main individuals involved in the correspondence?

The key figures were Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, representing Arab interests, and Lieutenant Colonel Sir Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner to Egypt, representing the British government.

Why was the territorial definition in the correspondence controversial?

The controversy stemmed from an ambiguous exclusion clause regarding "portions of Syria" to the west of specific cities (Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo). While Arabs believed Palestine was included in the promised independent state, the British later argued it was implicitly excluded, leading to a long-standing dispute.

How did the Balfour Declaration and Sykes–Picot Agreement impact the correspondence?

Both the secret 1916 Sykes–Picot Agreement (which partitioned Ottoman territories between Britain and France) and the public 1917 Balfour Declaration (promising a national home for Jews in Palestine) were seen by Arab leaders as direct violations of the promises made in the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence, leading to a profound sense of betrayal.

What was the long-term impact of the McMahon–Hussein Correspondence on Anglo-Arab relations?

The conflicting promises and subsequent perceived betrayals generated deep mistrust and animosity, significantly "haunting" Anglo-Arab relations for many decades and contributing to ongoing political instability in the Middle East.